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It may seem novel that the chief ombudsman and the chief executive of the Department of the Prime Minister 
and Cabinet are writing an article together; 
however, this demonstrates our shared 
commitment to good government. For 
some time we have been discussing how to 
balance two principles that contribute to 
good government. The first is that public 
servants should provide free and frank 
advice to ministers. The second is that 
the public should have timely access to 
official information that enables them to 
participate in government decision making 
and hold the government accountable.
We both recognise the potential for 
tension between these two principles. If 
public servants give advice that is less than 
free and frank because of concerns about 
its public release, there is a risk to good 
government. This has led us to ask: to what 
extent can and should New Zealand’s 
public servants expect their advice to 
ministers to remain confidential? In this 
Asbtract
Concern exists that New Zealand hasn’t struck the right balance 
between two potentially competing principles of good government: 
officials should provide free and frank advice to ministers, and the 
public should have opportunities to participate in decision making 
and hold the government to account. Steps we have taken to address 
this include: strengthening constitutional underpinnings for free 
and frank advice (Cabinet Manual changes and issuing expectations 
for officials); a work programme to improve government agency 
practice in relation to the Official Information Act; and the Office 
of the Ombudsman reducing uncertainty about when advice can be 
withheld by issuing new principles-based guidance and providing 
more advisory services. 
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article we explore this and related questions 
from the different perspectives of our 
respective offices. 
From the Prime Minister’s Department 
perspective (and that of head of the policy 
profession), free and frank advice is 
crucial to government making good 
decisions, and achieving good outcomes 
for those who live in New Zealand. If 
concern about release of advice under the 
Official Information Act (OIA) 
discourages officials from providing free 
and frank advice – or ministers from 
seeking it – we need to address that. But 
we also need to use all the other means 
available to us to foster free and frank 
advice and open government.
From the chief ombudsman’s per-
spective, the Official Information Act needs 
to operate with as much certainty as 
possible. The subject of ‘free and frank 
advice’ and when it might be protected or 
not is a difficult and uncertain matter for 
chief executives and ministers. Creating as 
much certainty as possible is desirable, 
because that promotes good government. 
Providing ministers with free and frank 
advice – Andrew Kibblewhite
Advising ministers has long been a crucial 
public service role in countries with 
Westminster-style systems of government. 
Our own State Sector Act 1988, as 
revised in 2013, legally defines the role 
of public servants as ministerial advisors. 
The act refers to the advisor role in two 
clauses. Chief executives continue to be 
responsible to the appropriate minister 
for ‘the tendering of free and frank 
advice to ministers’ (section 32(1)(f)). In 
addition, chief executives are responsible 
for ‘the stewardship of the department 
or departmental agency, including of its 
medium- and long-term … capability, and 
capacity to offer free and frank advice to 
successive governments’ (section 32(1)(c)).
In my role as head of the policy 
profession, I am working to build a 
common understanding of what this 
advisor role means for public servants. 
Some of the points I made in a series of 
speeches about free and frank advice 
between 2015 and 2017 (Kibblewhite, 2015, 
2016) bear repeating:
For the record, I’m not suggesting that 
officials are the only experts who advise 
ministers, or that we are the only voices 
they should listen to – far from it. But 
our advice is important for a number 
of reasons. First, we are trained in how 
to offer analytically robust, practical, 
apolitical advice to ministers on 
achieving their goals. Our responsibility 
is to seek the best outcomes, not the 
political advantage of a party, faction, 
or particular sector of society. 
Added to that, the best advisors 
build relationships with stakeholders 
inside and outside of decision-making 
circles so we are well informed about 
how different choices will play out in 
the real world. And we are a professional, 
permanent cadre of advisors. We’ve 
seen many policies implemented before, 
sometimes successfully, sometimes less 
so. We’ve learned lessons when policies 
implemented against our advice have 
succeeded and policies we’ve backed 
have failed.
And finally, we have the unique 
advantage of providing advice from the 
privileged position of being on the 
inside. We see the shifting sands that 
governments are navigating, how much 
room they have to manoeuvre, how 
stakeholders are reacting, what impacts 
the media narrative is having on their 
choices, and we have the chance to 
position our advice so it can be most 
effective.
For these reasons, an impartial and 
politically-neutral public service is one 
of the strengths of our system of 
parliamentary democracy: it combines 
deep expert advice with democratic 
responsiveness. 
In the policy context I believe the State 
Sector Act stewardship provisions also give 
public servants a duty to look ahead and 
provide advice about the future challenges 
and opportunities New Zealand faces. This 
includes at times offering hard-hitting 
advice to the government of the day that 
the current policy mix might not be 
working, or drawing attention to emerging 
factors that may require existing goals to 
be refocused or replaced.1
Providing advice that is free and frank 
about immediate and longer-term issues is 
a demanding ask – and it is an art as much 
as a science. So it is important that we 
understand what it means to be both free 
and frank as a policy advisor.
The ‘free’ in free and frank isn’t the same 
thing as free speech. Public servants are 
entitled to their opinions, but it’s not 
part of their day job to share that with 
anyone, anywhere. The free part of free 
and frank means that public servants 
offer their best advice freely to decision 
makers, without withholding any key 
evidence or information. Free also 
means we shouldn’t second guess what 
ministers will want to do – it’s about 
telling ministers what they need to hear, 
not what we think they want to hear.
Frank means we don’t pull our 
punches with ministers. We are honest 
about where we think the pitfalls and 
risks are. However frank doesn’t mean 
foolish. As in any relationship there are 
smarter ways of saying things – we need 
to give the hard truths in the most 
‘Free and frank advice’ and the Official Information Act: balancing competing principles of good government 
The Cabinet Office revised the Cabinet 
Manual in 2017 ... [making] specific 
reference to the duty that ministers 
have, as the recipients of free and frank 
advice, ‘to give fair consideration and 
due weight to free and frank advice 
provided by the public service’ ...
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constructive and palatable way possible. 
(Kibblewhite, 2016, p.4)
Fostering free and frank advice and better 
public access to official information – 
Andrew Kibblewhite
We have taken a number of steps, over the last 
few years, to bolster officials’ understanding 
of their obligation to provide free and frank 
advice and ministers’ understanding of their 
obligation to receive it. The Cabinet Office 
revised the Cabinet Manual in 2017 so that 
it now, for the first time, makes specific 
reference to the duty that ministers have, 
as the recipients of free and frank advice, 
‘to give fair consideration and due weight to 
free and frank advice provided by the public 
service’ (section 3.8).
The state services commissioner, Peter 
Hughes, and I also took steps last year to 
strengthen public service and ministerial 
expectations regarding the supply of free 
and frank advice and policy stewardship. A 
working group led by the policy project 
team developed an expectations document 
which was formally issued by the state 
services commissioner in December 2017, 
along with a ‘frequently asked questions’ 
supporting document (State Services 
Commissioner, 2017a, 2017b). We engaged 
with ministers before finalising the 
expectations, and the prime minister has 
expressed her strong support for them. 
The new expectations document makes 
it clear that public servants are expected to 
provide advice that:
· identifies the nature, scale and 
significance of the policy issue or 
opportunity (with supporting 
evidence);
· is politically neutral while also being 
aware of relevant political contexts;
· recognises the historic, contemporary 
and potential longer-term 
dimensions or conditions;
· is comprehensive, objective and 
balanced to cover the range of 
options that address the issue(s);
· is honest about where the 
opportunities, benefits, costs and 
risks of all options are, and about the 
limitations, assumptions and 
information gaps in analysis;
· is clear about any trade-offs involved 
and which option(s) on balance are 
recommended;
· delivers any hard truths in the most 
palatable way possible; and
· covers implementation issues. (State 
Services Commissioner, 2017a)
We have an active programme 
underway to inform public service advisors 
at all levels about the expectations about 
free and frank advice and policy 
stewardship, with the policy project team 
most recently holding forums for policy 
managers across the public service on the 
subject. I will continue to do all I can to 
ensure that officials understand what is 
expected of them, and are supported to 
deliver on those expectations.
I am also conscious of the need to 
strike the right balance between enabling 
confidential consideration of free and 
frank advice, and enabling the public to 
access official information to support 
open government. The commitment 
made in the government’s Open 
Government Partnership National Action 
Plan 2016–18 to improve government 
agency practices around requests for 
official information under the Official 
Information Act is another important 
development. The State Services 
Commission and the Ministry of Justice 
are leading the actions being taken to 
deliver on that commitment by: 
· ensuring that information about the 
OIA (how to make requests, etc) and 
responses to requests are easy to 
access on agency websites;
· publishing OIA statistics (how many 
requests, time taken to respond, etc);
· developing a clear statement of 
government policy on proactive 
release of Cabinet papers and related 
material; 
· developing a suite of consistent 
measures about OIA performance;
· improving access to official 
information by publishing responses 
to requests on government websites 
and developing principles for more 
proactive release; and 
· supporting agencies to deliver by 
developing appropriate guidance and 
training. (Open Government 
Partnership New Zealand, 2016, p.11)
The steps outlined above underscore 
the commitment of the public service to 
lift our game on the transparency of 
government and in particular the OIA. We 
are working to put our house in order. To 
genuinely improve the environment for 
providing robust free and frank advice 
these steps need to be coupled with greater 
certainty about the circumstances under 
which free and frank advice can be held in 
confidence. Advice does not occur in a 
vacuum, and at times public servants can 
be affected by the extent to which they can 
rely on their candid advice remaining 
confidential, particularly where they are 
expressing different views from those of 
the government. This is a subject the chief 
ombudsman and I have discussed at length 
over the last year.
The policy settings that govern official 
information – Peter Boshier 
In the original design of Westminster-style 
government, public servants held a unique 
position as trusted and privileged insiders. 
The advice they provided was confidential: 
intended only for the eyes and ears of the 
politicians they served. In New Zealand, 
the Official Secrets Act 1951 sustained that 
position for over 30 years. The general rule 
was that official information should remain 
secret unless there was a good reason for 
releasing it. This meant that public servants 
could provide advice that challenged the 
The guiding principle [of the Official 
Information Act 1982] became 
availability: official information shall be 
made publicly available unless there is 
good reason to withhold it.
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views of ministers, secure in the knowledge 
that it was unlikely to end up on the front 
page of the newspaper. A connection between 
the Official Secrets Act and the Crimes Act 
made it a criminal offence to release official 
information without approval.
The principle underpinning the Official 
Secrets Act was turned on its head with the 
passage of the Official Information Act 
1982. The guiding principle became 
availability: official information shall be 
made publicly available unless there is good 
reason to withhold it.
The OIA identifies two good reasons 
for withholding official information that 
constitutes free and frank advice 
(colloquially known as the ‘good 
government’ provisions), in sections 9(2)
(f)(iv) and 9(2)(g)(i). These provisions 
reflect the view of the Danks committee 
(whose recommendations led to the OIA) 
that ‘to run the country effectively the 
Government of the day needs nevertheless 
to be able to take advice and deliberate on 
it, in private, and without fear of 
premature disclosure’ (Committee on 
Official Information, 1980, p.19).
The first of these ‘good government’ 
reasons for withholding official information 
is to maintain the constitutional convention 
protecting the confidentiality of advice 
tendered by ministers and officials – section 
9(2)(f)(iv) of the OIA. This section usually 
applies where the release of confidential 
advice given to ministers or Cabinet would 
hinder the orderly and effective conduct of 
government decision-making processes. 
Generally this section of the OIA only 
provides grounds for temporarily 
withholding the release of free and frank 
advice.
The second ‘good government’ reason 
for withholding official information is to 
maintain the effective conduct of public 
affairs through the free and frank 
expression of opinions – section 9(2)(g)(i) 
of the OIA. This section applies where 
release of the information would inhibit 
the future exchange of free and frank 
opinions that are necessary for the effective 
conduct of public affairs.
Both of the ‘good government’ reasons 
to withhold free and frank advice are 
subject to a public interest test: namely, that 
the need to withhold information is not 
outweighed by the public interest in its 
release. There are two matters of public 
interest that are particularly relevant here. 
The first is holding public servants to 
account for the advice they provide to the 
government, and holding ministers to 
account for the decisions made on that 
advice. The second is enabling public 
participation in the development and 
administration of laws and policies. The 
OIA balances the public’s right to know 
with the government’s need to receive the 
free and frank advice required to make 
good decisions.
Concerns about the practice of free and 
frank advice – Andrew Kibblewhite
In the last decade, a number of com-
mentators have expressed concern that 
despite the ‘good government’ provisions 
of the OIA, the presumption in favour 
of releasing official information has 
had unintended consequences for the 
provision of free and frank advice.
In 2013, Matthew Palmer gave an 
address to the Public Service Association 
and Fabian Society in which he pointed to 
a shortage of free and frank advice: ‘There 
is now, in my view, far too much second 
guessing by public servants of the political 
incentives on ministers – and too much 
pulling of punches in the provision of 
advice’ (Palmer, 2013, p.2). He pointed to 
evidence supporting this from the research 
of Nicola White at the Institute of Policy 
Studies, published in the book Free and 
Frank in 2007. Nicola White concluded 
from her research that:
there is now reasonable evidence that:
· blunt advice is offered less easily, 
and obfuscation and softer language 
are widely preferred;
· wide-ranging advice is restricted, 
with written documentation 
tending to stick to the safe middle 
ground and more adventurous 
thoughts being tested in discussion;
· if issues are delicate or difficult, they 
are dealt with orally;
· many people working at the centre 
or at sensitive levels of government 
work largely without creating 
records and, for example, will avoid 
email completely because of a lack 
of any assurance that their 
comments could be protected;
· documents that are clearly going to 
become publicly accessible tend to 
be written with that fate in mind, so 
they do not contain anything that 
could attract a headline or create a 
story in itself – the ‘front page of the 
Dominion test’ is becoming a public 
service norm equal in status to ‘no 
surprises for the minister’; the 
public record suffers from 
incomplete documentation and 
from papers that are written for the 
record rather than for the moment;
· relationships can be damaged when 
people, particularly ministers, 
perceive a group of officials to be 
‘writing for the record’ or ‘setting 
them up’ by creating paper trails;
· dissection of the exact role of 
officials and ministers in any overall 
piece of government policy work or 
decision-making can destabilise 
relationships, and create intrigue 
out of the ordinary business of 
supporting a politically responsible 
executive; and
‘Free and frank advice’ and the Official Information Act: balancing competing principles of good government 
I am also conscious of the need to strike 
the right balance between enabling 
confidential consideration of free and 
frank advice, and enabling the public 
to access official information to support 
open government. 
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· the fishbowl nature of working at 
senior levels in the public service 
appears to have made it more 
difficult to attract and retain staff. 
(Wright, 2007, p.271, quoted in 
Palmer, 2013, pp.2–3)
More recently there have been media 
reports about the preliminary results 
from a questionnaire that Chris Eichbaum 
of Victoria University and Richard 
Shaw of Massey University distributed 
through the New Zealand Institute of 
Public Administration. They received 
640 responses, with more than 80% 
from individuals employed in the state 
sector. More than half of the respondents 
(53%) indicated some agreement with 
the statement: ‘Public servants in 2017 
are less likely to provide a minister with 
comprehensive and free and frank advice’ 
(Eichbaum, 2017).
In regard to reversing this trend, 
Matthew Palmer has expressed the view 
that we should ‘insist that Ministers, and 
public servants, harden up. If the job is to 
give free and frank advice then that is what 
public servants have to do and Ministers 
have to like it.’ He envisaged this attitudinal 
change being achieved through leadership. 
‘Both at senior political and senior 
bureaucratic levels, there would need to be 
a formal acknowledgement that our system 
of government and constitution values free 
and frank advice as an objective and that a 
paucity of it is a problem’ (Palmer, 2013, 
p.6).
My own experience is that much free 
and frank advice is still given by officials – 
the art is far from dead. But I do concede 
that we have become less diligent about 
documenting that advice, and 
documentation matters. Without it the 
rigour of analysis is weakened through less 
exposure to subsequent scrutiny. The basis 
of decisions can also become lost with the 
passage of time and the Crown’s ability to 
defend its decisions, if challenged by way 
of judicial review, is weakened.
So what to do? I agree that Matthew 
Palmer’s prescription – that officials and 
ministers need to ‘harden up’ – is part of 
the remedy. Robust advice provided to 
ministers on the merits of a proposal 
should first be given, then appropriately 
released – ideally proactively, at a time that 
will most usefully support the public’s 
understanding of the policy decision. As 
discussed above, we have taken a number 
of steps to make sure officials understand 
what is expected of them in this regard.
I am, however, firmly of the view that 
‘hardening up’ is a necessary but not 
sufficient condition. Ministers and senior 
officials also need to have confidence that 
some advice – particularly early stage 
(often discretionary) advice that might 
directly challenge policy settings or the 
ideological priors of the minister – can be 
given and received in confidence. While the 
free and frank grounds for withholding 
advice offer some protection for this sort 
of discourse, neither ministers nor officials 
have felt confident in how those grounds 
will be applied. This uncertainty is 
damaging for good decision making 
because over time it has a chilling effect on 
the provision of free and frank advice. It is 
to the great credit of the chief ombudsman 
that he has acknowledged the important 
role his office plays in creating certainty for 
policy practitioners, and has taken steps as 
set out below. 
Clarifying the application of the OIA’s ‘good 
government’ provisions – Peter Boshier
The OIA has lately attracted attention 
related to whether or not the act is effective, 
whether it is applied efficiently, and whether 
reform is required. For the most part, the 
provisions of the act are clear. However, 
commentators have long recognised the 
elusive nature of clarity in relation to this 
area of law (in sections 9(2)(f)(iv) and 
9(2)(g)(i) of the OIA). For example, the 
Law Commission considered the ‘good 
government’ grounds in its 2012 review 
of the OIA, and recognised that they are 
among the grounds that cause the most 
difficulty for those who request and hold 
official information (Law Commission, 
2012, p.50).
There are two major contributions I 
can make in this area:
1. clearly stating my view – and therefore 
the lead I give to my office – on how the 
OIA provisions relating to free and 
frank advice should be applied. To 
achieve this, I have recently published 
detailed guides on the grounds for 
withholding free and frank and 
confidential advice to the government, 
and how they should be applied to 
information generated in the public 
policymaking process (Office of the 
Ombudsman, 2018a, 2018b, 2018c); 
2. making my office more available to 
officials faced with an official 
information request who are unsure 
whether the withholding of information 
is justifiable. I want my office to be 
known not just for investigation and 
recommendation, but also as a first 
stop for advice and guidance before a 
decision is made.
I am keen to achieve greater certainty, 
and I think it can be reached on a principled 
basis. Of course, one should never prejudge 
the outcome of any complaint. But just as 
with court work and litigation, it makes sense 
for officials planning to adopt a particular 
response to an OIA request to know what 
they are heading into and what the outcome 
might be. I have therefore instructed my 
office that we must be bold in giving that 
clarity, while still preserving our ability to 
investigate fully if required, and deliver an 
opinion and make recommendations if we 
think that an error has occurred. Over time, 
this initiative should result in a reduced 
need to make recommendations, as officials 
better understand the circumstances in 
The [Official Information Act] has lately 
attracted attention related to whether 
or not the act is effective, whether it is 
applied efficiently, and whether reform  
is required. 
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which withholding free and frank advice is 
permissible. 
A crucial element of good government 
is the ability of a chief executive or their 
staff to be able to give honest and fearless 
policy advice on an issue to ministers at an 
early stage. Ultimately, the soundness of 
the decision made (and converted into 
policy and statute) may depend on an 
initial robust analysis of what a problem is 
thought to be and what the best solutions 
seem to be. This is a fundamental aspect of 
democracy and must not be lost.  
For this reason, where discussion and 
advice is at a very early stage – it is 
exploratory, or ‘blue skies thinking’, or 
deliberately provocative – it ought to be 
protected. If that is not the case, the chilling 
effect of the release of early stage free and 
frank advice on the provision of such 
advice may undermine the integrity of this 
decision process. 
If I liken this approach to a potential 
journey with four phases, the first phase is 
alerting the minister that a journey may be 
needed, and indicating some possible 
routes. It is impossible to say at this early 
stage whether the journey will actually take 
place, or if it does what route the journey 
will take. If the minister indicates potential 
interest in embarking on this journey, the 
second phase is becoming clearer as to what 
the destination might be.
During these early stages, advice is 
more likely to require protection on the 
basis that disclosure would prejudice the 
future free and frank exchange of opinions 
necessary for the effective conduct of 
public affairs. However, general 
information could be released at this time 
about the policy’s scope or terms of 
reference, and the development plan or 
stages of policy development ahead 
(including timeframes for any public 
consultations and final decisions).
The third phase of the journey will 
involve reasonable certainty of the route 
and likely destination. By this time I 
think the principles of participation in 
democracy should weigh heavily. This is 
the chance for the public to know about 
policy and contribute to its development. 
Disclosure of any firm options being 
considered would usually fall within this 
phase. Detailed advice on the options 
may require protection to enable the free 
and frank exchange of opinions and 
orderly conduct of the decision-making 
process. However, a brief outline of 
options can usually be disclosed without 
undermining those interests. This allows 
the public to participate in the decision-
making process by offering a contestable 
stream of advice.
Finally, at phase four, where the 
journey is all but complete, there should 
be certainty that information will be 
released unless some wholly different 
withholding ground can be established. 
The strong public interest considerations 
that favour disclosure would be 
accountability and transparency of the 
decision on which option was chosen, the 
advice provided and reasons why that 
decision was made.
So, when officials are considering how 
to apply the ‘good government’ withholding 
provisions of the OIA to their free and 
frank advice, they must always be able to 
illustrate where in a governmental decision 
process information is being generated and 
for what purpose.
I hope that my explanation of what is 
appropriate at each stage in the process and 
my reflections on the importance of the 
beginning phase help to create the certainty 
that I am looking for. If it is less clear where 
in the continuum policy advice is at, 
reasonable certainty can be instilled through 
a candid discussion with my office to obtain 
an objective view on whether information 
can be protected at that time or not.
Conclusions – Andrew Kibblewhite and Peter 
Boshier
Good government requires officials to be 
able to provide free and frank advice to 
ministers in confidence. And it requires the 
public to have opportunities to participate 
in decision making and hold the 
government accountable for its decisions. 
Getting the balance right between these 
two principles matters, as too much of 
the latter may result in less of the former, 
and vice versa. Between us, we have been 
actively using any means in our power to 
foster free and frank advice, while also 
encouraging open government. 
From inside executive government it 
has been necessary to strengthen the 
constitutional underpinnings that 
influence how free and frank advice is 
delivered and received. We have done this 
through recent changes to the Cabinet 
Manual and by issuing formal expectations 
for chief executives. Government agencies 
also need to get better at dealing with 
public requests for information in a timely 
fashion. We both support the programme 
of work underway to achieve that.
We agree that the path to fostering free 
and frank advice involves the chief 
ombudsman and his office creating as 
much certainty as possible on how the 
‘good government’ provisions of the OIA 
are applied. This greater clarity will be 
provided by the new guides on those 
provisions and the office’s better availability 
to give advice at the start – in both cases, 
being as thorough as possible about the 
relevant factors relating to this area of 
official information. 
We hope our collective efforts to clarify 
expectations of officials and to improve 
certainty and confidence in the application 
of the OIA can enhance the appetites of 
both ministers and officials to receive and 
offer challenging stewardship advice – ‘blue 
‘Free and frank advice’ and the Official Information Act: balancing competing principles of good government 
We agree that the path to fostering  
free and frank advice involves the chief 
ombudsman and his office creating as 
much certainty as possible on how the 
‘good government’ provisions of the OIA 
are applied. 
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skies thinking’ – that comes early in the 
policy process. Our aspiration is that both 
requesters and the agencies and ministers 
who receive the requests can operate with 
increasing confidence. This will enable them 
to increase their speed in handling requests 
and disclosing information, or to know 
when withholding is more clearly justified.
We now wait with interest to see what 
impact these initiatives have on both the 
provision of free and frank advice and the 
release of official information to the public. 
We anticipate that the balance between the 
two will continue to evolve, as citizens 
expect to be more involved in the design 
of policies and services, and as enabling 
digital and other technologies emerge.
1 The guidance on policy stewardship issued by the State 
Services Commissioner in December 2017 explicates 
this understanding (State Services Commissioner, 2017a, 
2017b).
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